I. INTRODUCTION
The Universal Serial Bus (USB) is a ubiquitous interface standard being widely used for connecting storage to consumer devices [1] . Because of its convenience and ease of connectivity, the USB port has become an essential component of consumer electronics devices such as flash disks, keyboards, cell phones, chargers, speakers, and printers. However, the USB interface has the following three weaknesses when it is used for consumer storage devices [2] : (1) anyone (e.g., an unauthorized user) could read or steal confidential information easily since the information is stored in plaintext format; and (2) an adversary could intercept or attack the transmitted information since the transmit channel between the device and the computer is not secure. Therefore, despite their practicality, USB Mass Storage Devices (MSDs) have been prohibited in an enormous number of environments. To solve these problems, and extend the applications of USB consumer storage devices, an authentication protocol can be implemented to ensure secure communications between the device and the computer.
Ever since Lamport proposed the first authentication protocol [2] , many authentication protocols have been proposed for different applications. Hwang and Li [3] proposed an authentication protocol using a smart card. However, their protocol could not withstand the masquerade attack. To improve security, Ku and Chen [4] proposed an improved authentication protocol using a smart card. Later, Yoon, Ryu and Yoo [5] found that Ku and Chen's improved authentication protocol was however vulnerable to the parallel session attack, and subsequently proposed a new authentication protocol using a smart card, but Hsiang and Shih [6] later demonstrated that it was vulnerable to three kinds of attacks. Hsiang and Shih proposed their new authentication protocol using a smart card; however, Shim [7] found that Hsiang and Shih's protocol was vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack.
Kim and Hong [8] proposed a multimodal biometric authentication protocol that employed teeth, image and voice in mobile environments. To improve performance, Kim, Chung and Hong [9] , and Lee, Kim and Cho [10] proposed two new protocols that all used person specific authentication using personal biometric characteristics such as face, teeth, and voice. However, all these protocols are not ideally suitable for USB MSDs because their stored information can easily be read out or require significant local complex computations.
To protect the privacy of a file transferred to a storage device, Yang, Wu and Chiu [11] proposed the first secure control protocol using the Schnorr signature scheme [12] . However, Chen, Qin and Yu [13] indicated that Yang et al.'s protocol [11] was vulnerable to the forge and replay attacks. Besides, Lee, Chen and Wu [14] found that the performance of Yang et al. protocol [11] was computationally heavy due to significant modular exponentiation operations. To solve those problems, Lee et al. [14] proposed a three-factor authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) that requires the password, smart card, and biometric characteristic for authentication.
Compared with the use of only password, biometric keys have the following advantages [15] : 1) Biometric keys cannot be lost or forgotten; 2) Biometric keys are very difficult to copy or share; 3) Biometric keys are extremely hard to forge or distribute; 4) Biometric keys cannot be guessed easily.
Compared with the traditional public key cryptosystem, the ECC can provide better performance because it can achieve the same security level using a smaller key size. For example, the 160-bit ECC and 1024-bit from the popular RivestShamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem have the same level of security [16] . Therefore, Lee et al. protocol [14] was previously considered to be more suitable for USB consumer storage devices. However, this paper will demonstrate that the protocol is vulnerable to the password guessing attack, the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, and the replay attack.
In this paper, an enhanced three-factor security protocol is introduced that removes the shortcomings of past three-factor security protocols. Detailed operations of the new protocol are provided with comprehensive security analysis that proves the robustness of the protocol against various attacks.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II gives a review of the three-factor authentication protocol followed by its security issues discussed in Section III. Section IV introduces the proposed security protocol as part of this work. The protocol's immunity from various attacks and other related features is analyzed in Section V. Section VI analyzes the proposed protocol's computational cost. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF THE THREE-FACTOR ELLIPTIC CURVE
CRYPTOSYSTEM PROTOCOL There are three phases in Lee et al. protocol [14] : (1) the registration phase; (2) the verification and data encryption phase; and (3) the key agreement phase. The details of these phases are described in this section. Notations used in this paper are first defined as follows: A. System Environment To manage security for a USB MSD, AS restricts the data transfers over the USB interface. U is allowed to transfer data via the USB interface only when U could pass AS's authentication. When U wishes to transfer a file to a storage device via the USB interface, U is required to input their username, password and biometric characteristic to verify legitimacy.
When U is successfully authenticated, a shared session key is generated between U and AS. Then, the session key will be used to encrypt the files transferred via the USB interface. When U decrypts the files on the storage devices, U must do the same authentication and generate the same session key for the original file. Every filename and user's identity will have a session key and different files or users' identity have different session keys. To ensure system security, the temporarily stored session key will be deleted after encrypting or decrypting the file. Lee et al.'s protocol [14] has the following three characteristics: (1) only authorized users can access the USB consumer storage devices; (2) files taken from the storage devices cannot be decrypted without the session key; and (3) other legal users cannot decrypt a legal classified file even if it is copied to their storage device. Therefore the original file is secure. Lee et al.'s three-factor authentication protocol [14] is illustrated in Fig. 1 . U inserts their storage device into a client terminal and inputs their password, identity and biometric signature (phase 1). Mutual authentication is then executed between U and AS (phase 2). U obtains a session key from AS if they are successfully authenticated (phase 3). With this key, U can store an encrypted file on the storage device.
B. Registration Phase
When U wants to be a legal user of AS, then U has to be registered through the following steps:
1) U inputs their biometric characteristic U B through a specified biometric device and provides a password, 2) Upon receiving { , ( Therefore, the protocol [14] is somewhat vulnerable to the DoS attack due to the unrepeatability of biometric characteristic.
C. Replay Attack
Suppose A could control the communication channel between U and AS since messages are transmitted via an insecure channel in the login and key agreement phase. Therefore, A could intercept, insert, delete, or interpolate any messages at will. A could intercept a message m 1 sent by U. Then, A could replay it to AS. Although A cannot compute the session key, A is successful as long as AS accepts the login request. Therefore, the protocol [14] is vulnerable to the replay attack.
IV. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section proposes significant enhancements to the three-factor authentication protocol. Before the proposed protocol operations are described, a fuzzy extractor [18] used in the proposed protocol is defined as illustrated below:
Definition 1: -Metric Space [18] . A metric space is a set  with a distance function : A fuzzy extractor extracts a nearly random string  from its biometric characteristic input  in an error-tolerant way. If the input changes but remains close to  , then the extracted  remains the same. To assist in recovering  from a biometric characteristic input  , a fuzzy extractor outputs an auxiliary string  . However,  remains uniformly random for a given  . The fuzzy extractor is formally defined as below:
Definition 4: -Fuzzy Extractor [18] . A ( , , , ,
) fuzzy extractor is given by two procedures, Gen and Rep:
1) Gen is a probabilistic generation procedure, which on (biometric characteristic) input    outputs an "extracted" string {0,1} l   and an auxiliary string  .
Here, l U denotes the uniform distribution on l-bit binary strings. 2) Rep is a deterministic reproduction procedure allowing to recover  from the corresponding auxiliary string  and any vector  close to  : for all ,
Like Lee et al. protocol [14] , the proposed protocol in this paper also consists of the three phases, i.e., the registration phase, the verification and data encryption phase, and the key agreement phase. The system environment of the proposed protocol is the same as Lee et al. protocol. 
A. Registration phase

V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security of the proposed protocol is analyzed for USB consumer storage devices. Burrows-AbadiNeedham (BAN) logic [19] , [20] has been used to demonstrate that the proposed protocol provides secure authentication. Then, the security assessment is performed to test whether the proposed protocol can overcome weaknesses in past security algorithms.
A. Authentication Proof Based on BAN-logic
The notations of BAN logic are as follows:
The principal P believes a statement X, or P is entitled to believe X.
The formula X is fresh.
The principal P has jurisdiction over the statement X. P X  :
The principal P sees the statement X.
The principal P once said the statement X.
The formula X or Y is one part of the formula (X, Y).
The formula X combined with the formula Y.
The formula X is encrypted under the key K.
The formula X is hash with the key K.
The principals P and Q use the shared key K to communicate. The key K will never be discovered by any principal except P and Q. sk :
The session key used in the current session.
Main logical postulates of the BAN logic are as follows:
The message-meaning rule:
The nonce-verification rule:
According to the analytic procedures of the BAN logic, the proposed protocol must then satisfy the following test goals in order to prove the system is secure:
First, the proposed protocol is transformed to the idealized form as:
Second, the following assumptions about the initial state of the protocol are made to analyze the proposed protocol:
; Third, the idealized form of the proposed protocol is analyzed based on the BAN logic rules and the assumptions. The main proofs are stated as follows:
According to Msg 1 , the following is obtained:
According to 4 A , the message-meaning rule is applied:
S AS U ID aP F 
According to Msg 2 , the following is obtained:
According to 3 A , the message-meaning rule is applied:
According to 1 A , the freshness-conjuncatenation rule is applied:
According to 5 S , the BAN logic rule is applied to break conjunctions to produce:
   Goal 6 According to 5 A , the jurisdiction rule is applied to get:
Goal 1 According to 7 A , the jurisdiction rule is applied to get:
Goal 5 According to Msg 3 , the following is obtained:
According to 2 A , the freshness-conjuncatenation rule is applied to get: 12 :
According to 12 S , the BAN logic rule is applied to break conjunctions to produce: 13 :
Goal 7 According to 6 A , the jurisdiction rule is applied to get 15 :
Goal 4 According to 8 A , the jurisdiction rule is applied to get 16 :
According Therefore, they cannot verify the correctness of U pw . Therefore, the proposed protocol should withstand the password guessing attack.
2) DoS attack
In the proposed protocol, the inputted biometric characteristic of the same person are also different every time. However, the device can get the correct U  through the fuzzy extractor algorithm. Therefore, U can pass the device's verification and the proposed algorithm thus withstands the DoS attack.
3) Replay attack
Suppose adversary A intercepts the message m 1 sent by U and replays it back to AS. Without knowing value U w , A cannot compute  for a newly generated bP . Then, AS could determine the attack by checking the correctness of  . A may intercept the message m 2 sent by AS and replay it to U. However, U can identify the attack by checking the correctness of  since a is generated for every session. Therefore, the proposed algorithm should withstand the replay attack.
4) Stolen-verifier attack
In the proposed protocol, AS maintains no password table at all. Therefore, the proposed algorithm should withstand the stolen-verifier attack. From the above description, it has been shown that the proposed protocol should provide mutual authentication between U and AS, therefore by definition, the proposed algorithm should also withstand the man-in-the-middle attack.
5) Impersonation attack
VI. COMPUTATIONAL COST ANALYSIS
In this section, the proposed protocol is compared with Yang et al. protocol [11] and Lee et al. protocol [14] in terms of relative computational cost. This work analyzed the target protocols [11] , [14] and explicitly divided the protocols' operations in terms of crypto-operations. Then, the relative computational times and the absolute times were subsequently calculated as before [14] , [21] . Notations are as follows: 
